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Abstract
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in a model with transaction costs and price
impact where two agents are incentivized to trade towards a target. The two types of
frictions – price impact and transaction costs – lead the agents to two distinct changes in
their optimal investment approach: price impact causes agents to continuously trade in
smaller amounts, while transaction costs cause the agents to cease trading before the end
of the trading period. As the agents lose wealth because of transaction costs, the exchange
makes a profit. We prove the existence of a strictly positive optimal transaction cost from
the exchange’s perspective.
Keywords: Transaction costs, Price impact, Equilibrium, Targeted trading, TWAP, In-
completeness, Trading frictions
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 91B51, 91B25
1 Introduction
We study a financial equilibrium model with frictions stemming from both transaction
costs and price impact. Two agents are incentivized to trade towards a targeted number
of shares throughout the trading period. In equilibrium, the agents seek to maximize their
expected wealth minus a penalty for deviating from their targets. Their wealth is further
1The authors would like to thank Xiao Chen and Kasper Larsen for helpful discussions on this work. The
second author acknowledges support by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DMS#1908255
(2019-2022). Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF).
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reduced by transaction costs and is affected by the perceived price impact on the stock
price from their trades.
Incomplete equilibrium is notoriously difficult to study. When the incompleteness stems
from frictions, this difficulty is exacerbated. This work proposes a tractable model for a
financial equilibrium with two simultaneous frictions. We seek to answer two questions:
(1) How do transaction costs and price impact affect prices and strategies in equilibrium?
(2) What is the optimal level of transaction costs?
The main contribution of this work is that the effect of transaction costs in equilibrium
is distinct from that of price impact. Price impact affects the equilibrium stock price and
depresses the rate of trade, whereas transaction costs cause the agents to cease trading
early in the trading period. We also prove the existence of a strictly positive optimal level
of transaction costs, where optimality is determined from the perspective of the market’s
exchange. The exchange collects the transaction fees as the agents trade.
The two frictions that we focus on are transaction costs and price impact. When
studied individually, transaction cost equilibrium models often resort to simplifications in
order to draw conclusions. Our model shares this approach, as it is simple enough to
remain tractable while complex enough to capture differing effects of our two frictions.
Weston [21] proves the existence of a transaction cost equilibrium in a tractable model
with deterministic equilibrium annuity prices. Continuum-of-agent models, where market
clearing is averaged over infinitely many agents, are studied in Vayanos and Vila [19],
Vayanos [17], Huang [12], and Da´vila [8]. Herdegen and Muhle-Karbe [11] study equilib-
rium with transaction costs where clearing holds approximately, up to a leading order.
For proportional transaction costs, Gonon et. al. [10] study equilibrium with an ergodic
objective. Lo et. al. [14] and Buss et. al. [5] study the numerics behind transaction cost
equilibria without establishing the existence of an equilibrium. In contrast, we prove the
existence of an equilibrium with proportional transaction costs (and price impact) in a
standard setting with two of agents, market clearing, and consumption at a terminal time.
Price impact and optimal liquidation models for a single agent take the price impact
form as given and allow agents to consider how the size and timing of their trades will
impact the traded asset price and, hence, future wealth. Our equilibrium model endoge-
nizes price impact, which is realized in the stock’s drift in the form proposed in Cuoco
and Cvitanic´ [7]. We incorporate price impact in our model by modeling it through
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off-equilibrium price paths. Off-equilibrium paths describe how prices react to trading
strategies even though a given trading strategy may be suboptimal. The optimal trad-
ing strategy determines the on-equilibrium price path. Both agents’ on-equilibrium price
dynamics must coincide with the equilibrium stock price. In this way, price impact af-
fects equilibrium prices, even though it is only modeled through each individual agent’s
perceived off-equilibrium price paths.
Other models have endogenized price impact in an equilibrium setting using various ap-
proaches. Kyle [13] uses a game theoretic framework, where the market maker attempts to
filter out private information from the aggregate trades of noise traders and an informed
trader. Vayanos [18] and Sannikov and Skrzypacz [15] use private trading target infor-
mation to endogenize price impact. Choi et. al. [6] endogenize price impact by allowing
off-equilibrium price paths to vary in a Cuoco and Cvitanic´ [7]-sense while also allowing
their agents’ trading targets to be private.
Our modeling set-up is most similar to Choi et. al [6], who study targeted trading in
Nash equilibria with price impact. We introduce transaction costs into a reduced form of
their setting in order to compare the effects of both frictions (price impact and transaction
costs) in equilibrium. Our model shares similarities with others in terms of single-agent
models and equilibrium settings. Linear-quadratic models with trading targets are stud-
ied in several works, including Bank et. al. [2], Sannikov and Skrzypacz [15], and Voß [20].
Gonon et. al. [10] use linear-quadratic controls and allow for proportional transaction costs,
rather than a quadratic approximation to transaction costs, as in Brunnermeier and Ped-
ersen [4], Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [9], and Bouchard et. al. [3].
Every transaction fee paid by the agents is income for the market’s exchange. Higher
transaction costs generate more income for the exchange for every share traded, but lower
transaction costs induce the agents to trade a higher volume of shares. Consequently,
we prove that there exists a strictly positive level of transaction costs that maximizes
the exchange’s expected profit. Optimal transaction costs have been of interest starting
most notably with the introduction of the Tobin tax in Tobin [16]. Previous equilibrium
approaches consider optimality from a welfare perspective. The continuum of agents in
Da´vila [8] differ in their beliefs about the dividend’s distribution. The agents’ belief differ-
ence versus the central planner’s choice of distribution when calculating welfare leads to a
strictly positive optimal transaction tax. In Weston [21], the welfare decreases as transac-
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tion costs increase, leading to zero as the welfare optimizing transaction cost parameter. In
our model, the agents are identical in their beliefs and differ only in their trading targets.
Nonetheless, we prove the existence of a strictly positive optimal transaction cost from the
exchange’s perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model inputs. Section 3
presents our main result, Theorem 3.3, which establishes the existence of a price impact
equilibrium with transaction costs. The choice of an optimal transaction cost from the
perspective of the exchange is presented in Section 4. The proofs are contained in Section 5.
2 The model
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon, which we think of as one trading day in length. We
work in a continuous-time setting and let B = {Bt}t∈[0,T ] be a Brownian motion on a
probability space (Ω,F ,P). The market consists of two traded securities: a bank account
and stock. The bank account is a financial asset in zero-net supply with a constant zero
interest rate. The stock is in constant positive net supply with the supply denoted by
n > 0. It pays a dividend of D at time T . The random variable D is measurable with
respect to σ (Bu : 0 ≤ u ≤ T ) and E[D2] < ∞. We let σ be the progressively measurable
process such that E
∫ T
0
σ2udu <∞ and
D = E[D] +
∫ T
0
σudBu
guaranteed by the martingale representation theorem. The equilibrium stock price will
be determined endogenously in equilibrium and is denoted Ŝ = {Ŝt}t∈[0,T ]. The price is
constrained at time T so that ŜT = D. We assume that all goods are denominated in a
single consumption good.
Two investors, i = 1, 2, trade in the market. They each seek to maximize expected
wealth yet are subjected to inventory penalties throughout the trading period. Their wealth
is further penalized by transaction costs, which are proportional to the rate of trade at the
rate λ > 0. Their wealth is indirectly penalized by perceived price impact from trades.
For every share purchased, the agents perceive that the stock’s drift decreases linearly.
Each agent i has a target number of shares ai she wishes to acquire (or sell off) through-
out the trading period. The random variables a1 and a2 are assumed to satisfy E[a
2
i ] <∞
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and be independent of the Brownian motion B. Agent i’s filtration Fi = {Fi,t}t∈[0,T ] is
given by
Fi,t := σ
(
ai, Ŝu : u ∈ [0, t]
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
A trading strategy θ = {θt}t∈[0,T ] denotes the number of shares held in stock. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that θ is admissible for agent i if it is adapted to Fi, ca`dla`g, of finite
variation on [0, T ] P-a.s., and satisfies E
∫ T
0 (σtθt)
2
dt < ∞. We write Ai to denote the
collection of agent i’s admissible strategies. Agent i is endowed at the beginning of the
trading period with n/2 shares of stock. We normalize the shares in the bank account to
zero. We allow for θ0 to differ from n/2, as the agents may choose to trade a lump sum
immediately. In the absence of transaction costs or the penalty term given in (2.3) below,
the agents’ allocations would be Pareto optimal. However, the presence of frictions and
penalties will motivate the agents to deviate from their initial positions.
For i = 1, 2, since θ ∈ Ai is of finite variation, we decompose θ into
θt =
n
2
+ θ↑t − θ
↓
t , t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
where θ↑, θ↓ are adapted to Fi, ca`dla`g, nondecreasing, and
{t ∈ [0, T ] : dθ↑t > 0} ∩ {t ∈ [0, T ] : dθ
↓
t > 0} = ∅. (2.2)
A change in trading position is possible at time 0, and we allow for θ↑0 > 0 or θ
↓
0 > 0 as
long as (2.2) holds.
At the close of the trading period, agents consume their acquired dividends. They
are subjected through their optimization problems to inventory penalties throughout the
trading period. For i ∈ {1, 2} and a given θ ∈ Ai, the penalty term, or loss term, for agent
i is measured by
Lθi,T :=
1
2
∫ T
0
κ(t)
(
γ(t)
(
ai −
n
2
)
−
(
θt −
n
2
))2
dt. (2.3)
The function κ : (0, T )→ (0,∞) describes the intensity of the penalty, while γ : [0, T ] →
[0, 1] describes the desired intraday trading target trajectory. Both agents share the same
deterministic functions κ and γ. We assume that γ is ca`dla`g, nonnegative, bounded in
absolute value by one, and nondecreasing. Our main example is time-weighted average
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price (TWAP), where the intraday trajectory function is γTWAP(t) := t/T . We assume
that κ is measurable and
∫ T
0 κ(t)dt is finite.
The agents perceive a price impact as the result of their trades. For i = 1, 2 and a
trading strategy θ ∈ Ai, we model this impact via the off-equilibrium stock price’s drift by
dSθi,t = κ(t)
(
c0(t; a1 + a2)− c1θt + γ(t)c2
(
ai −
n
2
))
dt+ dMt, S0 ∈ R. (2.4)
The function c0 and constants c1, c2 will be determined in equilibrium and are the same
for both agents. The constant c1 will be a free parameter that determines the level of
price impact in the market. The c1 = 0 case corresponds to an equilibrium without price
impact, where the agents are price-takers. Following the work of Choi et. al. [6] without
transaction costs, we work with off-equilibrium stock prices whose martingale term M and
initial value S0 are independent of θ and i.
Price impact in (2.4) is realized through the drift of the stock as in Cuoco and Cvi-
tanic´ [7]. Larger values for c1 result in more price impact because the more an agent buys,
the more she drives her perceived future prices down. While traditional price impact mod-
els, such as Almgren and Chriss [1], affect the stock price directly, our variation of price
impact affects the future returns of the stock by depressing them when a trader seeks a
larger market share.
For agent i ∈ {1, 2} and a trading strategy θ ∈ Ai, agent i’s perceived wealth process
is given by
Xθi,t =
n
2
S0 +
∫ t
0
θudS
θ
iu − λ
(
θ↑t + θ
↓
t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.5)
We recall that the decomposition of θ in (2.1) allows for θ↑0 and θ
↓
0 to differ from zero.
Both frictions – price impact and transaction costs – are at play in the perceived wealth
dynamics. Agent i’s objective is
E
[
Xθi,T − L
θ
i,T | Fi,0
]
−→ max
over θ ∈ Ai, where Lθi,T is defined in (2.3) and X
θ
i,T in (2.5).
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3 Equilibrium
In an equilibrium, the stock price is determined so that markets clear when both agents
invest optimally. The equilibrium stock price must agree with both agents’ perceived prices
when the optimal strategies are applied.
Definition 3.1. Let λ > 0 be a given transaction cost level. Trading strategies θ1 ∈ A1
and θ2 ∈ A2, a price process Ŝ = {Ŝt}t∈[0,T ], and price impact coefficients c0, c1, c2 form a
price impact equilibrium if
(a) Strategies are optimal: For i = 1, 2, we have that
E
[
Xθii,T − L
θi
i,T | Fi,0
]
= sup
θ∈Ai
E
[
Xθi,T − L
θ
i,T | Fi,0
]
, (3.1)
where Lθi,T is defined in (2.3), X
θ
i,T in (2.5), and the off-equilibrium price impact
stock dynamics are given in (2.4) with coefficients c0, c1, and c2.
(b) Markets clear: We have θ1,t + θ2,t = n for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(c) Prices are consistent: The equilibrium stock price process Ŝ is an Itoˆ process with
ŜT = D and for t ∈ {u ∈ [0, T ] : dθ
↑
1,u + dθ
↓
1,u > 0}, we have that
Sθ11,t = S
θ2
2,t = Ŝt.
The price impact stock dynamics of Sθ11 and S
θ2
2 are given in (2.4) with coefficients
c0, c1, and c2.
Even though off-equilibrium, the agents perceive a price impact from their trades, the
on-equilibrium stock price must agree with the agents’ perceived prices when their optimal
strategies are applied. Item (c) of Definition 3.1 requires the perceived prices to agree
with the realized equilibrium price when trade occurs. (Since there are only two agents
in the model, trade occurs if and only if agent 1 trades.) Therefore, in equilibrium, the
two agents may have different perceived prices at times when they do not choose to trade.
This requirement on perceived prices in equilibrium is similar to employing shadow prices
in equilibrium since an equilibrium stock price can only be uniquely identified when trade
occurs; see Weston [21].
Market clearing in Definition 3.1(b) requires clearing of the stock market, however
Walras’ Law holds in our model in that the other markets (money market and real goods)
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clear as well. For i = 1, 2 and a given strategy θ ∈ Ai and equilibrium stock price Ŝ, we
define the realized wealth in equilibrium through its self-financing condition (see (2.5)) by
X̂θt :=
n
2
Ŝ0 +
∫ t
0
θudŜu − λ
(
θ↑t + θ
↓
t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
We define the corresponding holdings in the money market account by
θ
(0)
t := X̂
θ
t − θtŜt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.2)
We recall that the interest rate has been normalized to zero, since consumption only occurs
at one point in time.
Lemma 3.2 presents a version of Walras’ Law applied to a price impact equilibrium with
transaction costs. Its proof is presented in Section 5. Lemma 3.2 shows that the money
market account provides the mechanism by which transaction costs exit the economy.
Lemma 3.2. For a given transaction cost λ > 0, let a price impact equilibrium satisfying
Definition 3.1 be given with optimal stock holdings θ1, θ2 and equilibrium stock price Ŝ.
For i = 1, 2, we let θ
(0)
i,t correspond to the equilibrium money market holdings at t of agent
i with stock market strategy θi, as in (3.2). Then the money market clears,
θ
(0)
1,t + θ
(0)
2,t = −λ
(
θ↑1,t + θ
↓
1,t + θ
↑
2,t + θ
↓
2,t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
and the consumption market clears at T ,
θ1,T ŜT + θ2,T ŜT = nD.
To begin constructing our equilibrium, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, we let
aΣ := a1 + a2 and Ai := ai −
1
2
aΣ.
The random variables Ai describe the deviation of the trading targets ai from the aggregate
target aΣ. We note that A1 +A2 = 0.
The presence of transaction costs causes the agents to stop trading before the end of
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the trading period. To this end, we define the last trading time τ by
τ := inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : |A1|
1 + 2c1
1 + c1
∫ T
t
κ(u)
(
γ(u)− γ(t)
)
du ≤ λ
}
. (3.3)
The time τ is a random variable valued in [0, T ). We also define the random variable χ by
χ :=
|A1|(1 + 2c1)
1 + c1
∫ T
0
κ(u)γ(u)du. (3.4)
The magnitude of χ will determine if trade occurs in the model or if the agents are deterred
from trading by prohibitively high transaction costs.
The following theorem is our main result. The proof of Theorem 3.3 can be found in
Section 5.
Theorem 3.3. Let λ > 0 and c1 > −
1
2 be given. Suppose that κ : (0, T ) → (0,∞)
is measurable with
∫ T
0 κ(u)du < ∞ and that γ : [0, T ] → [0, 1] is ca`dla`g, nonnegative,
bounded by one, and nondecreasing. There exists a price impact equilibrium where the
price impact stock dynamics in (2.4) have coefficients c0 and c2 given in terms of c1 by
c0(t) := c1n−
1 + 2c1
2(1 + c1)
γ(t)(aΣ − n) and c2 :=
c1
1 + c1
. (3.5)
For i = 1, 2, the equilibrium holdings θi ∈ Ai are given for t ∈ [0, T ] by
θi,t :=

n
2 +
Ai
1+c1
γ(t), t < τ,
n
2 +
1∫
T
τ
κ(u)du
{∫ T
τ
κ(u)γ(u) Ai1+c1 du −
λsign(Ai)
1+2c1
}
, t ≥ τ and χ > λ,
n
2 , t ≥ τ and χ ≤ λ,
(3.6)
where τ is defined in (3.3), χ is defined in (3.4), and the sign function convention is
sign(0) = 0 so that
sign(x) :=

−1, x < 0,
0, x = 0,
1, x > 0.
We let Ŝ = {Ŝt}t∈[0,T ] be defined by
Ŝt := E[D] +
∫ t
0
σudBu +
1
2
∫ T
t
κ(u)
(
γ(u)(aΣ − n)− c1n
)
du. (3.7)
Then, Ŝ, θ1, θ2, c0, c1, and c2 form a price impact equilibrium. Moreover, the agents’
filtrations agree in that F1,t = F2,t for all t ∈ [0, T ].
For a given transaction cost parameter λ > 0, Theorem 3.3 shows that equilibrium is
not unique. Indeed, there exists a distinct equilibrium for every choice of price impact
coefficient c1 > −
1
2 .
3.1 Effects of frictions in equilibrium
Both transaction costs and price impact affect equilibrium, and each friction has its own
distinct modeling characteristics and equilibrium effects. Both frictions penalize the agents
through their wealth reduction. Transaction costs do so by directly subtracting transaction
fees from wealth, while price impact does so indirectly by depressing the stock’s drift with
each increase in the number of shares held.
From a modeling perspective, agents are held accountable for transaction costs in equi-
librium through market clearing, and their wealth decreases as a result. Price impact
frictions appear only as perceived changes in off-equilibrium asset prices and wealth in
the individual optimization problems. Price impact is not incorporated explicitly into the
market clearing condition, but the perceived prices must align with the realized prices in
equilibrium by Definition 3.1(c).
Equilibrium effects of the two frictions are similar in that more frictions lead to less
trade. However, each friction has its own mechanism by which it impacts equilibrium
outcomes. First, we consider the effects of price impact, and we suppose that the level of
transaction costs is fixed. Higher (and positive) levels of the price impact coefficient c1
cause the agents to trade less, while also causing a linear decrease in the equilibrium stock
price. The decrease in the perceived stock prices transfers over to the realized equilibrium
stock price Ŝ in (3.7). The case when c1 = 0 corresponds to a price-taking equilibrium, in
which the agents’ perceived stock dynamics are not impacted by trade.
The equilibrium effects from transaction costs are perhaps more subtle. When trade
occurs in equilibrium, the trading strategies are unaffected by transaction costs. Transac-
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tion costs determine how long agents are willing to trade by affecting τ in (3.3). Larger
values of λ produce smaller values of τ , meaning that agents are not willing to continue
trading if the penalty incurred by transactions costs is sufficiently large.
Moreover, the on-equilibrium stock price Ŝ in (3.7) is unaffected by transaction costs.
The apparent lack of an effect for Ŝ occurs because the on-equilibrium stock price can only
be uniquely determined when trade occurs. When trade does not occur, as is the case at
the end of the trading period under transaction costs, Ŝ is consistent with equilibrium in
that the agents will still agree not to trade using the price Ŝ. See Da´vila [8] and Weston [21]
for a similar phenomenon in equilibrium models with transaction costs.
4 Optimal transaction cost
The agents pay transaction costs at a rate λ > 0 proportional to the number of shares
traded. As the agents lose the wealth paid out in transaction costs, an exchange collects
the fees. Higher values of λ mean that the exchange will receive more fees with every share
traded. However, higher values of λ cause the agents to stop trading sooner, resulting in
fewer shares traded. Given a distributional estimate on the trading targets (i.e., priors), the
exchange can find a strictly positive optimal transaction cost proportion that maximizes
its expected profit.
In this section, we make the dependence on λ explicit in the notation by denoting
θi = θ
(λ)
i and τ = τ(λ). We fix a price impact coefficient c1 > −
1
2 . By Theorem 3.3,
an equilibrium exists, and the total profit received by the exchange in that equilibrium is
given by
Profit(λ) := λ
((
θ
(λ)
1,T
)↑
+
(
θ
(λ)
1,T
)↓
+
(
θ
(λ)
2,T
)↑
+
(
θ
(λ)
2,T
)↓)
.
By market clearing and the monotonicity of the optimal trading strategies, we see that
Profit(λ) = 2λ
∣∣∣θ(λ)1,T − n2 ∣∣∣ .
The exchange will not have advanced knowledge of the agents’ trading targets, and instead
it must estimate the targets by using its ex ante priors.
Proposition 4.1 asserts that a strictly positive optimal transaction cost level exists for
the exchange. The proof of Proposition 4.1 is presented in Section 5.
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Proposition 4.1. Let c1 > −
1
2 be given. Suppose that κ : (0, T )→ (0,∞) is measurable
with
∫ T
0 κ(u)du < ∞ and that γ : [0, T ] → [0, 1] is ca`dla`g, nonnegative, bounded by one,
nondecreasing, and there exists t ∈ [0, T ) so that γ(t) > 0. Also, suppose that 0 < E
[
A21
]
<
∞. Then, there exists λ̂ > 0 so that
λ̂ ∈ Argmax {λ > 0 : E [Profit(λ)]} .
Example 4.2. To illustrate the exchange’s choice of optimal transaction cost level, we
consider an example with TWAP traders. We take T := 1, n := 100, κ(t) := 1, γ(t) :=
γTWAP(t) = t, and we allow the price impact coefficient c1 > −
1
2 to be arbitrary. For a
given transaction cost level λ > 0, we have that
Profit(λ) = 2max
(
0,
λA1
1 + c1
− λ
√
2λA1
(1 + c1)(1 + 2c1)
)
.
Each agent begins trading with 50 shares. The exchange estimates that agent 1 will seek
to obtain a targeted number of shares that is uniformly distributed on (50, 55), while it
believes that agent 2 will target exactly 50 shares. The exchange’s expected profit can be
computed by
E [Profit(λ)] =
8
5
∫ √2.5
0
λy2
1 + c1
max
0, y −
√
2λ(1 + c1)
1 + 2c1
 dy.
Figure 1 plots the exchange’s expected profit as a function of λ. The four plots vary in
the degree of the agents’ perceived price impact, which is measured by the parameter c1.
The case c1 = 0 corresponds to a price-taking equilibrium with no price impact. When
c1 > 0, the agents perceive a non-zero level of price impact.
In this example, the exchange’s choice of optimal transaction cost increases with increas-
ing price impact parameter c1. However, the exchange’s optimal expected profit decreases
as the perceived price impact increases.
5 Proofs
We begin with a proof of Lemma 3.2, which provides a version of Walras’ Law in our
setting.
12
Figure 1: The exchange’s expected profit in equilibrium is plotted as a function of the transac-
tion cost λ > 0. Each plot corresponds to a different level of price impact, which is measured
by varying the perceived price impact parameter c1 > −
1
2
.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let λ > 0 be given, and let θ1, θ2, and Ŝ be parameters in a price
impact equilibrium satisfying Definition 3.1. Conditions (b) and (c) in Definition 3.1
guarantee that the consumption market clears at T by
θ1,T ŜT + θ2,T ŜT = (θ1,T + θ2,T )D = nD.
Moreover, the money market clears for all times t ∈ [0, T ] by
θ
(0)
1,t + θ
(0)
2,t
= 2 ·
n
2
Ŝ0 +
∫ t
0
(θ1,u + θ2,u) dŜu − λ
(
θ↑1,t + θ
↓
1,t + θ
↑
2,t + θ
↓
2,t
)
− (θ1,t + θ2,t) Ŝt
= nŜ0 +
∫ t
0
n dŜu − nŜt − λ
(
θ↑1,t + θ
↓
1,t + θ
↑
2,t + θ
↓
2,t
)
= −λ
(
θ↑1,t + θ
↓
1,t + θ
↑
2,t + θ
↓
2,t
)
.
Next, we prove our main result, Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We break the proof up into steps.
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Step 1: Information sets. We first verify that F1,t = F2,t = σ(a1, a2, Ŝu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t) for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Since Ŝ0 given in (3.7) reveals the value of aΣ = a1+ a2, then for any i ∈ {1, 2},
Fi,t = σ
(
ai, Ŝu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t
)
= σ
(
a1, a2, Ŝu : 0 ≤ u ≤ t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
as desired. For the remainder of the proof, we let F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ] denote the shared
filtration for the agents so that F1,t = F2,t = Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 2: Admissibility. We next show for i = 1, 2, that θi defined in (3.6) is admissible;
that is, θi ∈ Ai. The function γ is ca`dla`g and nondecreasing, while
Ai
1+c1
and τ are F0-
measurable. To verify integrability, we use the square-integrability of Ai and σ as well as
their independence to ensure that for some constant C > 0, we have
E
∫ T
0
(σuθi,u)
2
du ≤ C E
∫ T
0
σ2u
(
1 +A2i
)
du
≤ C E
[
1 +A2i
]
E
∫ T
0
σ2udu
<∞.
Thus, θi ∈ Ai.
Step 3: Optimality. Next, we check that θi ∈ Ai is optimal in (3.1). In order to help us
with computations, we define γ˜ for t ∈ [0, T ] by
γ˜(t) :=

γ(t), t < τ,
∫
T
τ
κ(u)γ(u)du− λ(1+c1)
|A1(1+2c1)|∫
T
τ
κ(u)du
, t ≥ τ and χ > λ,
0, t ≥ τ and χ ≤ λ.
(5.1)
The definition of γ˜ in comparison with θi in (3.6) shows that θi,t =
n
2 +
Ai
1+c1
γ˜(t). Since
A1 = 0 implies that χ = 0 and since τ < T , we have that γ˜ is well-defined in the t ≥ τ
and χ > λ case.
We define Yi = {Yi,t}t∈[0,T ] by
Yi,t := E
[∫ T
t
κ(u)
(
c0(u) +
n
2
+ γ(u)(1 + c2)
(
ai −
n
2
)
− (1 + 2c1)θi,u
)
du | F0
]
.
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With the form of c0 and c2 in (3.5) and θi given in (3.6), we see that
Yi,t = Ai
1 + 2c1
1 + c1
∫ T
t
κ(u) (γ(u)− γ˜(u)) du.
By the definition of τ in (3.3) and χ in (3.4), we have that Yi,t = λ signAi for t ≤ τ and
χ ≥ λ, while Yi,t ∈ signAi[0, λ] for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all values of χ. Since θi is constant
after τ , we see that ∫ T
0−
Yi,udθi,u = λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
. (5.2)
Then, for any θ ∈ Ai,
Ai(1 + 2c1)
1 + c1
∫ T
0
κ(u) (γ(u)− γ˜(u)) (θu − θi,u) du − λ
(
θ↑T + θ
↓
T
)
=
∫ T
0−
Yi,ud (θ − θi)u − λ
(
θ↑T + θ
↓
T
)
by integration by parts
=
∫ T
0−
Yi,udθu − λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
− λ
(
θ↑T + θ
↓
T
)
by (5.2)
=
∫ T
0−
(Yi,u − λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
dθ↑u −
∫ T
0−
(λ+ Yi,u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
dθ↓u − λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
≤ −λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
. (5.3)
For an arbitrary θ ∈ Ai, we define Vi(θ) by
Vi(θ) := E
[
Xθi,T − L
θ
i,T | F0
]
, (5.4)
where Lθi,T is defined in (2.3), X
θ
i,T in (2.5), and the perceived off-equilibrium price dynam-
ics in (2.4) have initial stock price and martingale parts given by the proposed equilibrium
stock price Ŝ in (3.7).
By the definition of Ŝ in (3.7), the martingale part of Ŝ, Sθ1 , and S
θ
2 is given by the
martingale
∫ ·
0 σdB. Since θ ∈ Ai is adapted and E
∫ T
0 (σuθu)
2
du < ∞, we have that{∫ t
0
σuθudBu
}
t∈[0,T ]
is a square-integrable martingale with respect to F. We use this
property in the calculation of Vi(θ) below.
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For c0 and c2 given in (3.5) and the initial stock price given by Ŝ0 in (3.7), we have
Vi(θ) = E
[
Xθi,T − L
θ
i,T | F0
]
=
n
2
Ŝ0 − λE
[
θ↑T + θ
↓
T | F0
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
κ(t)
((
c0(t) + γ(t)c2
(
ai −
n
2
))
θt − c1θ
2
t −
1
2
(
θt −
n
2
− γ(t)
(
ai −
n
2
))2)
dt | F0
]
=
n
2
Ŝ0 − λE
[
θ↑T + θ
↓
T | F0
]
−
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
κ(t)
(n
2
+ γ(t)
(
ai −
n
2
))2
dt | F0
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
κ(t)
(((
c1 +
1
2
)
n+ γ(t)
(1 + 2c1)Ai
1 + c1
)
θt −
(
c1 +
1
2
)
θ2t
)
dt | F0
]
.
The above calculation reveals that when optimizing over θ in (5.4), the second-order con-
dition requires that c1 > −
1
2 .
For notational convenience, we define
α(t) :=
(
c1 +
1
2
)
n+ γ(t)
(1 + 2c1)Ai
1 + c1
and β := c1 +
1
2
,
so that
Vi(θ) =
n
2
Ŝ0 − λE
[
θ↑T + θ
↓
T | F0
]
−
1
2
∫ T
0
κ(t)
(n
2
+ γ(t)
(
ai −
n
2
))2
dt+ E
[∫ T
0
κ(t)
(
α(t)θt − βθ
2
t
)
dt | F0
]
.
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Therefore, by algebraic manipulation and applying (5.3),
Vi(θ) − Vi(θi)
= E
[
λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T − θ
↑
T − θ
↓
T
)
+
∫ T
0
κ(u) (α(u)(θu − θi,u)− β(θu − θi,u)(θu + θi,u)) du
]
= E
[
λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T − θ
↑
T − θ
↓
T
)
+
∫ T
0
κ(u)
(
(α(u) − 2βθi,u)(θu − θi,u)− β(θu − θi,u)
2
)
du
]
≤ E
[
λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T − θ
↑
T − θ
↓
T
)
+
∫ T
0
κ(u)(α(u)− 2βθi,u)(θu − θi,u)du
]
= E
[
λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T − θ
↑
T − θ
↓
T
)
+
Ai(1 + 2c1)
1 + c1
∫ T
0
κ(u) (γ(u)− γ˜(u)) (θu − θi,u)du | F0
]
≤ E
[
λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
− λ
(
θ↑i,T + θ
↓
i,T
)
| F0
]
by (5.3)
≤ 0.
Thus, θi is optimal for agent i.
Step 4: Markets clear. For t < τ , the stock market clears since θ1,t+θ2,t = n+A1+A2 = n.
For t ≥ τ and χ ≤ λ, we have θ1,t + θ2,t = n. Similarly, for t ≥ τ and χ > λ, the stock
market clears since
θ1,t + θ2,t
= n+
1∫ T
τ
κ(u)du
{∫ T
τ
κ(u)γ(u)
A1 +A2
1 + c1
du −
λ (sign(A1) + sign(A2))
1 + 2c1
}
= n+ 0 + 0 = n.
Step 5: Equilibrium prices are consistent. By the martingale representation of the dividend
D, we notice that ŜT = D, as desired. Finally, we verify that for t ∈ {u ∈ [0, T ] :
dθ↑1,u + dθ
↓
1,u > 0}, we have that
Sθ11,t = S
θ2
2,t = Ŝt. (5.5)
Since t ∈ {u ∈ [0, T ] : dθ↑1,u + dθ
↓
1,u > 0} ⊆ [0, τ ], it is sufficient to verify that (5.5) holds
for t ∈ [0, τ ].
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For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ (0, τ), the drift of Sθii,t is given by
drift
(
Sθii,t
)
= κ(t)
(
c1n
2
−
1
2
γ(t) (aΣ − n)
)
,
which agrees with the drift of Ŝ in (3.7). Since the martingale components and initial
values of Ŝ, Sθ1 , and S
θ
2 do not depend on the choice of i = 1, 2, or θ ∈ Ai, we conclude
that (5.5) holds for all t ∈ [0, τ ], as desired.
Next, we prove Proposition 4.1, which establishes the existence of an optimal transac-
tion cost, λ̂ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Theorem 3.3 establishes the existence of an equilibrium with
optimal trading strategies θ
(λ)
i ∈ Ai given in (3.6) for every λ > 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we introduce the function γ˜ for t ∈ [0, T ] and λ > 0 by
γ˜(t, λ) :=

γ(t, λ), t < τ(λ),
∫
T
τ(λ)
κ(u)γ(u)du− λ(1+c1)
|A1(1+2c1)|∫
T
τ(λ)
κ(u)du
, t ≥ τ(λ) and χ > λ,
0, t ≥ τ(λ) and χ ≤ λ.
Here, χ is defined in (3.4), and we make λ’s dependence on γ˜ explicit. For any λ > 0, we
have that
θ
(λ)
1,T −
n
2
= θ
(λ)
1,τ(λ) −
n
2
=
A1
1 + c1
γ˜(τ(λ), λ).
We first seek to show that λ 7→ γ˜(τ(λ), λ) is continuous, from which we will conclude that
λ 7→ Profit(λ) is continuous. On {A1 = 0}, χ = 0 so that χ < λ for all λ > 0, and thus,
λ 7→ γ˜(τ(λ), λ) is continuous in this case.
On {A1 6= 0}, we consider 0 < λ1 < λ2. Then, τ(λ2) ≤ τ(λ1) < T . For notational
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simplicity, we define C := 1+c1|A1|(1+2c1) and τ1 := τ(λ1), τ2 := τ(λ2). We have that
λ1C =
∫ T
τ1
κ(u)
(
γ(u)− γ˜(τ1, λ1)
)
du
=
∫ τ2
τ1
κ(u)
(
γ(u)− γ˜(τ1, λ1)
)
du
+
∫ T
τ2
κ(u)
(
γ(u)− γ˜(τ2, λ2)
)
du︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λ2C
+
∫ T
τ2
κ(u)
(
γ˜(τ2, λ2)− γ˜(τ1, λ1)
)
du
=
∫ τ1
τ2
κ(u)
(
γ˜(τ1, λ1)− γ(u)
)
du+ λ2C +
(
γ˜(τ2, λ2)− γ˜(τ1, λ1)
)∫ T
τ2
κ(u)du.
Using that γ is nondecreasing, we see that γ˜(τ2, λ2) ≤ γ(u) for all u ∈ (τ2, τ1). By
rearranging terms, we arrive at
0 ≤
(
γ˜(τ1, λ1)− γ˜(τ2, λ2)
) ∫ T
τ2
κ(u)du
= C(λ2 − λ1) +
∫ τ1
τ2
κ(u)
(
γ˜(τ1, λ1)− γ(u)
)
du
≤ C(λ2 − λ1) +
(
γ˜(τ1, λ1)− γ˜(τ2, λ2)
) ∫ τ1
τ2
κ(u)du.
Therefore, on {A1 6= 0}, we have that
0 ≤ γ˜(τ1, λ1)− γ˜(τ2, λ2) ≤
C∫ T
τ1∨τ2 κ(u)du
(λ2 − λ1), (5.6)
from which we conclude that λ 7→ γ˜(τ(λ), λ) is continuous for λ > 0. Thus, λ 7→ θ
(λ)
1,T −
n
2
and λ 7→ Profit(λ) are continuous for λ > 0.
Next, we show that λ 7→ E[Profit(λ)] is continuous. For 0 < λ1 < λ2, we fix constants
λ, λ so that 0 < λ ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ λ. We let τ1 := τ(λ1) and τ2 := τ(λ2), as before.
Using (5.6) and that γ is nondecreasing, we see that
∣∣∣Profit(λ1)− Profit(λ2)∣∣∣ = 2
∣∣∣∣∣λ1 ∣∣∣θ(λ1)1,τ1 − n2 ∣∣∣− λ2 ∣∣∣θ(λ2)1,τ2 − n2 ∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 2λ2
∣∣∣θ(λ1)1,τ1 − θ(λ2)1,τ2 ∣∣∣+ 2 (λ2 − λ1) ∣∣∣θ(λ1)1,τ1 − n2 ∣∣∣
≤ 2
 λ
(1 + 2c1)
∫ T
τ(λ)
κ(u)du
+
|A1|
1 + c1
γ(T )
 (λ2 − λ1) .
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Taking expectations shows that for all 0 < λ ≤ λ1 < λ2 ≤ λ <∞, we have
E
[
|Profit(λ1)− Profit(λ2)|
]
≤ 2
 λ
(1 + 2c1)
∫ T
τ(λ) κ(u)du
+
E[|A1|]
1 + c1
γ(T )
 (λ2 − λ1) ,
which proves that λ 7→ E[Profit(λ)] is continuous for λ > 0.
Finally, we show that λ 7→ E[Profit(λ)] achieves a maximum for λ > 0. The assumption
that E[A21] > 0 and that there exists t ∈ [0, T ) for which γ(t) > 0 ensures that there exists
λ > 0 such that E[Profit(λ)] > 0. Since γ˜ is bounded by one, we have that
0 ≤ lim
λ↓0
E [Profit(λ)] ≤ lim
λ↓0
2λ E
[
|A1|
1 + c1
]
= 0.
We define the random variable λmax := 2|A1|
∫ T
0
κ(u)du. For λ ≥ λmax, we have that χ < λ,
where χ is defined in (3.4). In this case, trade does not occur, and
∣∣∣θ(λ)1,τ(λ) − n2 ∣∣∣ = 0. For
any λ > 0, we bound Profit(λ) by
Profit(λ) ≤
2λ|A1|
1 + c1
γ(T )I{λ≤λmax}
≤
2λmax|A1|
1 + c1
≤ A21 ·
4
∫ T
0 κ(u)du
1 + c1
.
Since E[A21] <∞, we apply the dominated convergence theorem to obtain that
lim
λ→∞
E[Profit(λ)] = 0.
Thus, λ 7→ E[Profit(λ)] achieves a maximum for λ > 0.
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